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G.C. Goddu announces that the primary purpose of his paper is to begin to explore
whether a general theory of argument context is possible. He begins by defining `argument' as "a
set of statements, one of which is designated the conclusion." This is very close to a standard
textbook understanding of argument as product. (One wonders how Goddu regards arguments
with divergent or serial structure where there is more than one conclusion. Are such structures
compounds of arguments, but not themselves arguments?) Goddu next presents a constraint or
necessary condition for any argument context:
For a given argument, the context of the argument is those facts relevant to the
determination of (i) the identity of the argument and (ii) the goodness or non-goodness of
the argument.
Determining argument identity may involve both disambiguating an argument text and supplying
unexpressed premises. That argument context may have a bearing on these issues seems
completely plausible. For Goddu, argument goodness involves two questions:
Are the premises adequate?
Do the premises sufficiently support the conclusion?
He quite rightly points out that whether the context will have a bearing on premise adequacy
depends on one's understanding of premise adequacy itself. If known truth or acceptability is
one's criterion, context will have a bearing, but not if the criterion is for example necessary truth.
Although Goddu explicitly indicates that this is not the only understanding of argument
goodness, he focuses on argument cogency defined this way:
A argument is cogent in a context T iff the premises are true and the premises sufficiently
support the conclusion in T.
He holds that truth is not context dependent. Surely this is correct on a correspondence theory.
Once one determines what statement is expressed by a given sentence, whether or not it is true
depends on the way the world is. This does not vary from context to context.
For Goddu, for the premises of an argument to sufficiently support the conclusion, their
actual support of the conclusion must be "at least as great as the required support." He regards
both actual and required support as context dependent. This again is completely plausible. How
strongly premises support a conclusion can vary widely given background knowledge, part of the
context of the argument. The strength of support required involves pragmatic considerations of
the cost of accepting the conclusion, again something that can vary from context to context.
For Goddu, then, a theory of argument context must capture sufficient facts so that one
can determine what argument or arguments are being expressed by a given source and whether
the premises sufficiently support the conclusion. "Any general theory of context that fails to
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capture sufficient facts for answering these questions is an inadequate theory." Goddu then
examines four theories of argument context. He finds the first, which he initially characterizes as
"fairly intuitively plausible," seriously wanting:
The context of an argument is just the particular situation in which the argument is made.
I question why this answer should even be regarded as intuitively plausible. I find "the particular
situation" vague. It seems to include the physical setting in which a source expresses an argument
and the persons in that setting. But, as Goddu points out, much of this would be irrelevant to
determining what argument a source is expressing and whether the premises sufficiently support
the conclusion. To answer those questions, it would seem that facts about the linguistic
dispositions, overall background beliefs, and the desires and purposes of those who were
witnesses to the propounding of a given argument would be relevant.
In this connection, Goddu's question of how a particular situation is to be delimited or
individuated raises in my mind the issue of whether one should think of being in a context as a
binary relation between an argument and a yet to be determined thing, or rather a ternary relation
between an argument, a person or the set of dispositions and beliefs constituting a person's
perspective, and this yet to be determined thing. Goddu asks, "What if I say something today that
clarifies exactly what one of my arguments is....Ten years from now is my comment...part of the
situation in which my argument is made?" Clearly, this would seem to depend on whether the
comment was available ten years from now. If it were available to some persons and not others,
would not those persons be in different situations or contexts?
These considerations suggest what Goddu recognizes in turning to the second
candidate——that context specifically involves the beliefs of the arguer and audience:
The context of an argument is some subset of the arguer's and audience's
beliefs/assumptions.
After pointing out that the most permissive version of this candidate would take the subset to be
simply the union of all the beliefs and assumptions of the arguer and audience, Goddu argues that
this set does not satisfy the constraint and no proper subset will either. "It is possible for both the
audience and arguer to be mistaken about what argument is expressed by a given source" and "It
is also possible for the arguer and audience to be mistaken about the facts relevant to both the
actual strength by which the premise supports the conclusion and the required strength."
To illustrate the first point, Goddu cites the possibility that both arguer and audience
could be mistaken about the meaning of some expression occurring in the source. This fact is
interesting, but I question whether it establishes Goddu's point. It allows that it is possible that
neither the arguer nor the audience properly understand the argument as expressed by some
source, typically a text. But Goddu has also said that the source can express a plurality of
arguments. Now presumably the arguer has understood the source, the argument text he has
uttered, as expressing a particular argument. Presumably the arguer understands what he meant to
say, even if this involves some deviant or non-standard meaning of an expression he has used in
saying it. Unless a member of the audience is at a loss to comprehend what the arguer has
uttered, she will have some non-standard understanding of this expression also, whether or not it
is the same understanding as that of the arguer. But certainly the arguer's beliefs or assumptions
about what this expression means are material to identifying the argument he is expressing and
these are included in his set of beliefs and assumptions. If anyone wanted to identify the
argument being put forward, he would need to be aware of these beliefs or assumptions. That the
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source could express some other argument when this expression is given a standard reading does
not show that it cannot express the argument the proponent understanding himself to be putting
forward. The facts about the standard meaning are not necessary or relevant to determining the
identity of the proponent's argument.
To illustrate the possibility that persons may be mistaken about facts relevant to assessing
the actual or required strength of an argument, Goddu asks us to consider a group of scientists
aware of a body of evidence which confirms that hypothesis to a certain degree. Unknown to
them, other scientists have framed a rival hypothesis which the evidence confirms to an even
higher degree. As Goddu sees it, these facts are relevant to the cogency of the argument for the
hypothesis but are included in the set of beliefs and assumptions neither of the scientists who
have put forward the argument for the hypothesis nor of those who have received it.
Appraising Goddu's point here goes to the heart of what we understand by argument
evaluation and indeed perhaps of the whole practice of argumentation. Are arguments to be
evaluated absolutely, as Goddu's mooting the possibility of a better supported unknown rival
hypothesis suggests, or are arguments——some arguments at least——to be evaluated against or
relative to a certain contextual background? One's answer may ultimately depend on one's
understanding of argumentation. Consider Ralph Johnson's characterization:
A pragmatic approach to argument begins by asking: "What purpose(s) does argument
serve?...The answer is: Many, no doubt. But preeminent among them is the function of
persuading someone (I call this person the Other) of the truth of something (I shall call
this the Thesis) by reasoning, by producing a set of reasons whose function is to lead that
person rationally to accept the claim in question (Johnson 2000, 149).
By presenting their confirming evidence to other scientists, have these scientists presented their
colleagues with reasons which should rightfully lead them rationally to accept their hypothesis?
(By accepting the hypothesis, we do not mean that their colleagues will become unalterably or
irreversibly committed to it. Rather they are granting a provisional acceptance, subject to
withdrawal in the light of a proper counterargument.) The answer depends, in part, on whether
the colleagues who received their argument have an epistemic duty to be aware of the better
confirmed rival hypothesis. But surely, if the independent researchers had not published their
results and there were no personal connections between the two groups, how could they be
expected to be aware that this rival hypothesis and its better confirmation constituted an
objection to the hypothesis whose defense they have just received? Assuming that they were
aware of no other objections, why would not the evidence the advocates of the hypothesis have
presented lead their colleagues rationally to accept it, given the colleagues' epistemic situation?
Should they later learn of the rival hypothesis and its better confirmation, they would ceteris
paribus be rationally compelled to withdraw their acceptance. But then their context would have
changed. The argument which was good in the previous context is no longer good in the new
context. Hence, I fail to see that the absence of information about the rival hypothesis from the
union of the beliefs and assumptions of the scientists defending the hypothesis and their
colleagues shows that there is no proper subset of these beliefs and assumptions which may serve
as a context for evaluating their argument with respect to that context.
It may be that Goddu would grant some points I have just made, in light of his
parenthetical remark that "we often resort to...facts [about the arguer's and audiences's beliefs and
assumptions] in determining argument identity and certain evaluative properties such as
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convincingness" (italics added). Goddu might reply that argument convincingness and argument
goodness are two different concepts, which someone like Johnson, taking a pragmatic approach,
has confused. Goddu may take that approach, but then it is open to the pragmatist to reply that
Goddu's characterization of the constraint on argument contexts is wrong and inappropriate. It is
not the facts relevant to determining the goodness or non-goodness of the argument which
constitutes in part its context, but the facts pertaining to its convincingness or nonconvincingness for each audience, given the particular commitments of that audience at a
particular time.
Goddu constructs his third candidate by building on certain pragmatic suggestions of
Charles Blatz. For Blatz, critical thinking takes place in a community of discussion and such a
community is constituted by a "`set of shared purposes, aims, or uses of reasons' and...[a] `shared
set of basic assumptions and procedures of reason'" (Blatz 1989, 109, quoted by Goddu). Given
this understanding of how communities are defined or identified, Goddu proposes:
The context of an argument is the set of facts that identify and specify the community of
discussion in which the argument is made.
He effectively shows that given his constraint, this proposal has serious shortcomings. Just when
does a set of aims and norms constitute a community? If the requirement is very minimal,
defining the context in terms of these norms may leave out means necessary for evaluating
particular arguments. Furthermore, any facts pertaining to evaluation of arguments seeking to
adjudicate disputes across communities or arguments not pertaining to the field of some
community of discussion would also be left out.
Goddu's final proposal, developing suggestions of Terence Parsons, claims
The context of an argument, at least the part concerning argument evaluation, is a set of
background assumptions and rules of inference.
As he points out, like the third proposal, this is too underdetermined. Whose assumptions are to
constitute the context? Goddu feels that Parsons would say the arguer. By contrast, I would argue
that if one were to go this route, one should take the audience's assumptions or the assumptions
of each member of the audience considered as a critical challenger. To take the evaluative stance
is to take the stance of someone who receives an argument. Whether reference is properly to
arguer or audience, one could still ask what if the assumptions were mistaken. Given Goddu's
constraint, could they be part of the material constituting the context of an argument? Could an
illegitimate inference rule, one which is deductively invalid or one——to use Toulmin's
terminology——which is an unwarranted warrant, a warrant not properly backed or even able to
be properly backed, be a context constituting factor? It could be if the constraint were framed in
terms of rational convincingness, a subjective goodness, rather than the objective goodness
which Goddu is using. From the latter perspective, these considerations reinforce Goddu's
arguments that this fourth view is significantly deficient.
Why should a mistaken inference rule or background assumption be a context
constituting factor? The answer is straightforward, if one accepts something like Ralph Johnson's
conception of argument. To convince rationally, one must not only present cogent reasons to
support some claim, but must answer objections to the claim and the reasons given for it,
including objections to the illative moves from those reasons to the claim, at least those
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objections of a particular prominence, salience, or force. As Johnson puts it,
If the arguer wishes to persuade Others rationally, the arguer is obligated to take account
of these objections and opposing points of view. To ignore them, not to mention them, or
to suppress them——these could hardly be considered the moves of someone engaged in
the process of rational persuasion (Johnson 2000, 160).
Now it is quite possible that some objections could be based on mistaken background
assumptions or improper inference rules. If so, the arguer's strategy in reply might seem
straightforward——simply rebut these mistaken assumptions. Still the arguer has an obligation
to make this reply occasioned by these mistaken factors. If the absence of these mistaken
assumptions means the absence of these objections, the arguer would not have this obligation to
meet them in their absence. But in such a situation, the arguer would be presenting the core of his
argument in a different context.
This brings me to what I regard as the most serious problem in Goddu's paper. Aside from
the briefest of references, he does not consider the work which Johnson and also Douglas Walton
have presented in numerous publications over the last fifteen years developing the concept of
1
argument context. Like Johnson, Walton understands argument to involve a pragmatic
dimension——one must understand the purposes for which arguments are given. For Walton this
involves identifying the context of dialogue in which the argument was generated. Walton has
presented a whole theory of types of dialogue and the implications of this theory for evaluating
arguments. In view of the centrality of this work and these authors, Goddu owes us a reply to this
body of material and an indication of how it does, or why it does not, have a bearing on his
project. Certainly, he needs to discuss this work as giving an explication of the notion of
argument context and, if he sees it as not advancing our understanding, he needs to indicate how
it is deficient.
This brings me to my final point. Should the constraint on our understanding of an
argument context be framed in terms of goodness or rational convincingness? Given the
pragmatic nature of the concept of context as developed by Johnson and Walton, and the fact that
the constraint as Goddu has presented it can be explicated purely semantically, as I believe his
development suggests, is the constraint appropriate for the notion of context? I believe that the
burden of proof is on Goddu to show that it is. This might be the next step in his further work on
argument contexts.

Note
1

Johnson has developed his views in particular in (1992) pp. 55-56, (1996) pp. 103-14 and 264-66,
and (2000) pp. 164-75. For Walton, see (1989) pp. 1-11, (1992) pp. 81-121 , and 1998.
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